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Was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Legal?

Andru E. Wall*
I. Introduction

D

iscussion of the jus ad bellum and the Iraq war is anything but simple and
uncontroversial. There is certainly no shortage of opinions on the subject.
One of the author’s favorite quotes is from General Wesley Clark, who said the
2003 invasion was legal, but illegitimate.1 You will appreciate the irony if you remember that the Independent International Commission on Kosovo established
by the United Nations called General Clark’s 1999 Kosovo campaign illegal, but
legitimate.2
When several leading international law professors were asked by a British newspaper, “Was the 2003 Iraq war legal?” their responses were illustrative.3 Professor
Malcom Shaw replied: “[O]n the basis of the intelligence we had at the time and the
publicly available knowledge, there was a credible and reasonable argument in favor
of the legality of the war.” Professor Christine Chinkin answered “no” because she
believed UN Security Council Resolution 1441 preserved for the Security Council
the decision on enforcement action. Professor Sir Adam Roberts replied: “There
was in principle a possible case for the lawfulness of resort to war by the US and its
small coalition.” Professor James Crawford answered simply: “It comes down to a
political judgment.”
Unfortunately this author thinks Professor Crawford’s statement is quite accurate, as it reflects the truism that law and policy are mutually affecting; nowhere is
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the interrelationship between law and policy more evident than in the jus ad
bellum. Nevertheless, let us briefly examine the legality of the recourse to force in
2003. First, the legal argument articulated by the coalition will be summarized;
then three criticisms of the coalition’s legal basis will be examined.
II. The Legal Justification for the 2003 Invasion
On March 20, 2003 as the invasion of Iraq began, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia delivered letters to the President of the Security Council providing notice that coalition forces had commenced military operations in Iraq. The
letters stated the use of force was necessary in response to Iraq’s material breach of
the ceasefire agreement reached at the end of hostilities in 1991 and the disarmament obligations contained in Security Council Resolution 687. The US letter succinctly stated: “In view of Iraq’s material breaches, the basis for the ceasefire has
been removed and use of force is authorized under resolution 678 (1990).”4
The legal justifications are explained more fully in a memorandum from the
British Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, to Prime Minister Tony Blair on
March 7, 2003 and three US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel opinions written in October, November and December of 2002.5 As there are no significant differences among the US, UK and Australian legal justifications, they will be
considered as the singular coalition case.
For the coalition, the war with Iraq began on August 2, 1990 when Iraq invaded
Kuwait—not with the recommencement of hostilities in March 2003. Iraq justified
its invasion of Kuwait on the basis of long-standing claims of sovereignty over
Kuwait, and claims that Kuwait engaged in various forms of economic warfare
against Iraq.6 However, there was little question that Iraq’s actions violated the
requirement contained in Article 2(3) of the UN Charter that States resolve their
disputes by pacific means and Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force against
the territorial integrity and political independence of another State. As a result,
within a few hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Security Council declared the
Iraqi action a breach of the peace in Resolution 660. Four days later the Security
Council explicitly recognized the right of Kuwait and its coalition partners to use
force in collective self-defense in Resolution 661. Throughout the fall of 1990 the
Security Council passed eleven resolutions that collectively denounced Iraq’s
invasion, declared it a breach of the peace, demanded Iraq’s immediate, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, recognized the right of individual or collective selfdefense, imposed an arms embargo and economic sanctions, and recognized Iraq’s
obligation to pay reparations.7
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Even as a US-led coalition commenced maritime interdiction operations and
began massing military forces, US diplomats aggressively pursued a Security
Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.
Finally, on November 27, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, which
authorized “all necessary means” to eject Iraq from Kuwait and “to uphold and implement . . . all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security to the area.”8 The resolution provided Iraq with “one final opportunity” to comply with the Security Council’s previous Chapter VII resolutions by
January 15, 1991.
Iraq failed to avail itself of this final opportunity, and so on the evening of January 16, 1991 a twenty-eight-nation, US-led coalition commenced Operation
Desert Storm. It is worth noting here that the Security Council did not make a further determination regarding whether Iraq had complied with its January 15 deadline. Member States made that determination themselves and relied upon the
Security Council’s November 1990 decision as authority to use force.
After six weeks of bombing and an astonishingly successful 100-hour ground
campaign Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqi army was in full retreat. As the Iraqi
army fled north, coalition aircraft continued to bomb Iraqi military targets. The
four-lane highway from Kuwait to Basra began to clog with the charred hulks of
hundreds of military vehicles and reporters began referring to it as the “Highway of
Death.” While the laws of war permitted the continued destruction of the Iraqi
army, at least until surrender, the coalition did not want to be seen as engaging in
“slaughter for the sake of slaughter.”9 And so, at 5 a.m. on February 28, 1991, Operation Desert Storm was unilaterally halted. Three days later General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, the commander of coalition forces, and his Iraqi counterpart negotiated a ceasefire agreement that established a demarcation line and contained provisions for the repatriation of Kuwaitis and prisoners of war held in Iraq.10
The ceasefire agreement was put into writing by the United States, vetted by the
Security Council and codified in Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991.11 It was the
longest resolution and most detailed ceasefire agreement in modern time and
included extensive disarmament provisions. The Resolution stated its provisions
established the “conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security.” The
Security Council predicated activation of the ceasefire upon Iraq’s unconditional
acceptance, which reluctantly came in a letter delivered to the Security Council on
April 6, 1991.12
Even before accepting the ceasefire, Iraq began violently suppressing uprisings
by the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north. The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 688, which called on Iraq to cease such repression
“as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the
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region.”13 The Security Council believed Iraq’s suppression of its citizens, which
was causing a destabilizing flow of refugees into neighboring countries, was a
threat to international peace and security. The United States and United Kingdom
used Resolution 688’s linkage between Iraq’s internal unrest and international
peace and security as the basis for invoking Resolution 678’s authorization of the
use of force as the enforcement authority.14 In other words, from the outset of the
ceasefire, the coalition believed Resolution 678’s authorization to use force to restore international peace and security in the region survived the ceasefire of
Resolution 687.
On several occasions between 1991 and 2003, the coalition used force in response
to what it deemed to be Iraq’s material breaches of the disarmament provisions of
Resolution 687 and justified its actions under the authority of Resolution 678.15
The Security Council never condemned these actions, nor questioned the reliance
on the continuing validity of 678. In fact, in Resolution 949 on October 4, 1994,
the Security Council explicitly reaffirmed Resolution 678.
In the fall and winter of 2002 as Saddam Hussein again impeded the work of UN
weapons inspectors, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which after recounting and deploring Iraq’s various violations of Resolution 687 at some length,
found Iraq to be in material breach of the ceasefire and afforded Iraq a “final
opportunity” to comply.
In accordance with the customary international law governing armistices, the
United States properly provided notice on March 17, 2003 that it considered the
ceasefire agreement to be denounced by Iraq: just as a right of self-defense may be
exercised unilaterally without resort to the Security Council, so too may any party
to a ceasefire agreement, even one endorsed by the Security Council, determine
that the ceasefire has been materially breached and announce that it is resuming
hostilities with the breaching party. As a final opportunity to avoid the resumption of offensive hostilities, the United States gave Saddam Hussein and his sons
48 hours to leave Iraq. They failed to seize this final reprieve and the invasion of
Iraq commenced, leading ultimately to Hussein’s capture and the fall of his
government.
III. Criticism of the Legal Basis for the 2003 Invasion
The legal basis put forth by the coalition to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq was
hardly without criticism. The Security Council does not conduct straw polls, but
France made no effort to hide the fact it would veto the so-called second or eighteenth resolution—a resolution finding Iraq in violation of Resolution 1441 and
explicitly authorizing the use of force to compel compliance.16 Any attempt to
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prognosticate the level of support in the Security Council, or in the international
community writ large, was complicated by the fact that France was quite public in
its insistence that the Security Council would not explicitly authorize force, and the
United States was equally public in its insistence that such authorization was not
legally required.
Over the intervening six years, many international law scholars have critiqued
the jus ad bellum basis for the 2003 invasion.17 Their criticism of the coalition’s legal case generally revolves around three concerns: 1) Resolution 678 only authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, 2) Resolution 687 does not permit
unilateral enforcement and 3) Resolution 1441 required further authorization or
findings by the Security Council before force could be used.
Resolution 678 Only Authorized Expelling Iraq from Kuwait
The coalition’s legal basis was grounded on the belief that Resolution 678 authorized not just the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, but more broadly the use of force
to restore international peace and security to the region and that Iraq’s material
breaches of Resolution 687 constituted a continuing threat to such peace and security. The plain language of Resolution 678 authorized “all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area” (emphasis added). Resolution 687 recalled the thirteen previous resolutions on the Iraq-Kuwait conflict,
reiterated its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, and
affirmed all thirteen previously referenced resolutions, including 678. Read as
such, Resolution 687 arguably sets the terms for what would be required to restore
international peace and security to the region.
At least two objections can be raised against this position. First, the United
States in 1991 did not believe Resolution 678 authorized anything more than expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In explaining the decision to implement a ceasefire
rather than pursue Hussein to surrender, several members of the US administration
indicated they believed the coalition’s mandate was limited to freeing Kuwait.18
However, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor at the time, couched the
rationale in political rather than legal terms in a book he wrote with President
George H.W. Bush: “Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the
United Nations’ mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish. . . . Unilaterally going significantly
beyond that mandate, we might have undermined the confidence of the United
Nations to make future grants of authority.”19 Remember the context of 1991: the
fall of the Soviet Union, the Security Council’s first authorization of the use of force
since Korea, and the hope that a new world order would be ushered in, a world
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order that would see the Security Council finally take its place as the primary guarantor of international peace and security. Nevertheless, even if the United States
initially viewed its mandate as limited, that view quickly evaporated with the establishment of the no-fly zones and the legal rationale put forth to justify the no-fly
zones, a rationale grounded in 678’s authority to restore international peace and
security in the region.
A second objection to the relevance of Resolution 678 in 2003 is that Resolution
678 only authorized those member States “co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait” to use force. In 1991, Kuwait communicated to the Security Council that
it requested assistance from the coalition in expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In 2003,
however, Kuwait made this statement to the Security Council: “Kuwait reaffirms
that it has not participated and will not participate in any military operation
against Iraq and that all measures we are undertaking are aimed at protecting our
security, safety and territorial integrity.”20 Admittedly, it is a bit of a stretch to argue
that the 2003 coalition was “cooperating” with the government of Kuwait.
This argument weakens, however, in light of the operational reality of the intervening twelve years. During that period, the coalition repeatedly took action
against Iraq, especially the establishment and enforcement of the no-fly zones that
extended beyond strict protection of and cooperation with Kuwait. Those uses of
force were consistently justified as authorized by Resolution 678 and the Security
Council never formally objected or ruled otherwise. Thus, the argument that 678
had a very limited purpose weakens in light of subsequent State practice and the atleast-tacit acceptance of such practice by the Security Council.
Resolution 687 Does Not Authorize Unilateral Enforcement
A second general criticism of the coalition’s legal basis for the 2003 invasion is that
once the ceasefire was encapsulated in a Security Council resolution it became an
agreement between Iraq and the Security Council and only the Security Council
could redress violations. The belief is that once the Security Council directs the
parties to a conflict to comply with a ceasefire agreement, as it did here in Resolution 687, the Security Council’s ceasefire directive has the force of law under Article
24 of the UN Charter and the parties may not resume hostilities without the express permission of the Security Council. In essence, a Security Council–approved
ceasefire agreement, such as Resolution 687, extinguishes the right of self-defense
and any prior Security Council authorization to use force and revives the controlling norm of Article 2(4).
This argument makes the fundamental error of confusing the suspension of
hostilities with their termination and it confuses a Security Council order to “cease
hostilities” with an order to “cease hostilities so long as the following ceasefire
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terms are complied with.” A ceasefire, which is synonymous with what was historically termed an armistice, is a suspension of arms that does not end the hostile relations between the two sides—the state of war remains both de jure and de facto.21
The customary international law governing armistices was codified in the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. It states an armistice only “suspends” military
operations and the parties may resume hostilities after providing proper notice,
and any “serious violation” of the armistice gives the other party the right to denounce the ceasefire and resume hostilities.22 A “serious violation” under Hague
IV is consistent with the “material breach” phrase that appears in Article 60(1) of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.23
As the continuing nature of the Iraq conflict seems to often be forgotten, the
following briefly summarizes the ongoing nature of the conflict between 1991 and
2003.24

• Between April 1991 and early 2003 over 250,000 sorties were flown by
coalition combat and reconnaissance aircraft over Iraq in enforcement of the
ceasefire agreement and no-fly zones. Those aircraft were fired upon by Iraqi
forces thousands of times and returned fire thousands of times, dropping bombs,
firing missiles and launching hundreds of cruise missiles into Iraq.25
• Within two days of Iraq’s acceptance of the formal ceasefire agreement, the
coalition (led by the United States, United Kingdom and France) established a nofly zone in northern Iraq in response to Iraq’s repression of its Kurdish
population. The coalition established a second no-fly zone a few months later in
southern Iraq after Shiite dissidents were brutally attacked by Iraqi helicopter
gunships.26
• On December 27, 1992, US aircraft shot down an Iraqi fighter plane flying in
the no-fly zone.
• In January 1993 the President of the Security Council twice issued
statements declaring Iraq to be in material breach of Resolution 687. US, British
and French aircraft attacked several air defense targets in southern Iraq and fortyfive Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched at a nuclear fabrication facility.
• On June 26, 1993 the United States launched twenty-four Tomahawk cruise
missiles against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in response to an
Iraqi assassination plot against former President George H.W. Bush.
• On September 3, 1996 the United States launched forty-four cruise missiles
at fifteen air defense sites located in the newly extended portion of the no-fly zone.
Fighter aircraft followed up these attacks the next day by bombing air defense sites
that had survived the cruise-missile attacks.
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• After another broken promise by Iraq in November 1998 to permit
resumption of inspections, President Clinton declared Iraq to be in material
breach of the ceasefire and ordered the execution of Operation Desert Fox, which
lasted four days, and involved 29,900 troops, thirty-seven ships and 348 aircraft
from the United States and additional forces from the United Kingdom. Those
forces launched nearly four hundred cruise missiles and over six hundred other
bombs and missiles at Iraqi military and weapons of mass destruction targets.27
• Between 1999 and 2002 Iraqi forces shot missiles and anti-aircraft fire at
coalition aircraft on over one thousand separate occasions. In the majority of
those incidents the coalition responded by bombing the offending Iraqi site and in
the process damaged or destroyed over four hundred targets. On other occasions
US and British aircraft attacked anti-ship missile sites, command-and-control
sites, military communications sites, and fuel and ammunition dumps.28
• In February 2001 two dozen coalition aircraft attacked five Iraqi targets
located just outside of the southern no-fly zone.

• Coalition aircraft dropped 606 bombs or missiles on 391 targets in 2002
alone.29
This may be low-intensity conflict, but only a lawyer could argue it was not an
ongoing armed conflict. This State practice strengthens the argument that the determination of material breach of a ceasefire agreement, even one endorsed by the
Security Council, can be unilaterally made by parties to the agreement. The United
States and other members of the coalition determined on numerous occasions that
Iraq materially breached the 1991 ceasefire agreement and unilaterally responded
to those violations with the use of force. Not only were those unilateral determinations of material breach not condemned by the Security Council, but the Council
itself recognized in 1994 in Resolution 949 the continuing validity of Resolution
678 and at least tacitly accepted the unilateral enforcement.
To argue that the coalition needed Security Council authorization before resuming offensive combat operations against Iraq in 2003 is to argue that the right
of self-defense and the use of force authorized by the Security Council in Resolution 678 were extinguished upon acceptance of the ceasefire agreement. Simply
put, such a contention is without basis in State practice and contrary to an international public policy that should encourage utilization of the Security Council—not
punish resort to it. If the right to use force were extinguished and the norm set forth
in Article 2(4) again became controlling upon acceptance of a ceasefire agreement,
the law would create a perverse disincentive to enter into such agreements. The State
prevailing in a conflict would be disinclined to agree to a ceasefire at any time prior to
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unconditional surrender. Such a law would leave no room for magnanimous efforts to limit the horrors of war through potentially life-saving reprieves.
Resolution 1441 Required Additional Action by the Security Council
A final criticism of the coalition’s legal justification for the 2003 invasion relates to the
failure to secure a second or eighteenth (depending on your perspective) resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force in response to Iraq’s continued material
breach of Resolution 687. Resolution 1441 recounted and deplored Iraq’s history
of violating Resolution 687 at some length, then found Iraq to be in material breach
of the ceasefire and afforded Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply. While France
and Russia stated publicly they did not believe the finding of “material breach” automatically authorized the use of force against Iraq, the United States and United
Kingdom argued that “the resolution established that Iraq’s violations of its obligations had crossed the threshold that earlier practice had established for coalition
forces to use force consistently with resolution 678.”30
No permanent member of the Security Council believed Iraq had complied with
Resolution 1441. While the Security Council held several sessions on this issue, the
United States and United Kingdom believed nothing in Resolution 1441 required
the Security Council to adopt another resolution to establish the continuing existence of a material breach, nor did they believe the use of force was predicated on
any other “triggering” mechanism.
The US State Department Legal Advisor noted there are important similarities
between Resolution 1441 and Resolution 678: “Using the same terminology that it
later adopted in Resolution 1441, the Council in Resolution 678 decided to allow
Iraq a ‘final opportunity’ to comply with the obligations that the Council had established in previous resolutions.”31 There was no requirement that coalition
members return to the Security Council for a determination that Iraq had failed to
comply, nor did they do so before commencing operations. “The language of Resolution 1441 tracked the language of Resolution 678, and the resolution operated in
the same way to authorize coalition forces to bring Iraq into compliance with its
obligations.”32
Resolution 1441 is a classic example of diplomatic finesse: it provided the coalition with a clear finding of “material breach,” while also requiring that Iraqi noncompliance be reported to the Security Council for “assessment.” In other words,
Resolution 1441 can be fairly read as an agreement to disagree—or simply as tacit
acceptance of the operational code that existed for more than twelve years. Specifically, political differences prevented positive action by the Security Council, which
meant that member States acting of their own volition would step into the void and
take the action they believed was necessary to restore international peace and
77
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security; those actions, based on the belief they were authorized by Resolution 678,
were never condemned by the Security Council.
IV. Conclusion
Today we see a vast disparity between the sophisticated institutions established to
regulate international trade and the relatively primitive system in place to regulate
the international use of force. To the extent its Chapter VII resolutions are legally
binding on all member States, the Security Council exercises very limited quasilegislative and -judicial powers, yet has no real enforcement powers. While the
UN Charter envisions a standing UN military force available to enforce the Security Council’s Chapter VII authorities, member States declined in practice to cede
such enforcement authority to the Security Council, preferring instead to keep
those powers to themselves.
The modalities of enforcement of Security Council resolutions will continue to
be debated, yet the normative foundation of the Charter survives the 2003 invasion
of Iraq. Remember the lengths to which the United States, United Kingdom and
Australia went to couch their legal rationale in terms of the Charter’s framework
and the relevant Security Council Chapter VII resolutions. The Charter lives on,
even when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act, and even when that
inaction forces member States to take enforcement action themselves.
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